These issues are likely to trigger post-election violence in 2027

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IEBC officials inspect electoral materials at Moi Secondary School, Nakuru West Sub County Tallying Centre before distribution to polling stations across the constituency on August 8, 2022. [File, Standard]

If history is anything to go by, we must brace ourselves for potentially problematic and conflictual 2027 General Election. The signs are already evident, and without proper preparation, we risk repeating past mistakes that have led to post-election violence, political instability, and national disillusionment.

As we move towards 2027, several factors raise concerns about the possibility of an acrimonious election. If left unaddressed in good time, these issues could lead to unrest and a legitimacy crisis for the incoming government. Let us delve into some of the factors.

First, former Prime Minister Raila Odinga’s bid for the chairmanship of the African Union Commission (AUC) was a high-stakes move that ultimately ended in disappointment. From the outset, the bid was contentious, given that Raila had spent months leading street protests and contesting the legitimacy of the Kenya Kwanza government. His sudden pivot to working with President William Ruto’s administration left many of his supporters feeling betrayed and disenfranchised. For a faction of the Azimio coalition, the AUC bid seemed like an olive branch—a way for Raila to exit active local politics with dignity. However, its failure may now reignite political hostilities. Some of his core supporters may view the 2027 elections as an opportunity to settle scores, questioning whether Raila’s overtures to the Kenya Kwanza leadership were ever in the nation's best interest.

Second, former Deputy President Rigathi Gachagua’s fallout with Ruto has opened a new front in Kenya’s political battleground. Dubbed ‘the truthful man’ by his supporters, Gachagua has not minced words about what he perceives as injustices and unprofessional conduct within the government. His public pronouncements paint the picture of a deeply fractured ruling coalition. The split between Ruto and Gachagua could escalate into an all-out political war, with each side mobilising regional and ethnic support. The real test will come at the ballot in 2027 where political scores will be settled. Whether this confrontation remains peaceful is a question that demands cautious attention.

Third, one of last year's most striking political events was the rise and street protests of the Gen Z movement. The youth, driven by frustration over governance failures, unemployment, and lack of opportunities, took on the government in unprecedented ways. While engagements between young people and political leaders have since intensified, there remains a real risk that unresolved issues could culminate in electoral tensions. Many Gen Z voters will participate in their first or second election with high expectations. If they perceive 2027 as yet another cycle of broken promises, they may use the ballot to express their frustrations. This could manifest in high voter turnout against the incumbent administration or, worse, post-election unrest should they feel disenfranchised again.

Fourth, economic conditions have historically played a significant role in shaping electoral outcomes. If by 2027, the Kenya Kwanza government has not delivered on its economic promises, the electorate could turn against it. The reality is that economic hardships breed political dissatisfaction. A struggling population is more likely to be radicalised, particularly if they feel that their financial woes stem from government policies. Kenya’s economy remains susceptible to both internal mismanagement and external shocks such as global inflation, climate change, and geopolitical conflicts. If household financial strains persist, voters could approach the 2027 elections with resentment. The danger is that economic grievances can quickly morph into violent demonstrations, especially when political leaders capitalise on public discontent for their gain.

A key lesson from Kenya’s electoral history is that we are often slow in preparing for elections, particularly in ensuring they are legitimate. Since 2007, the country has struggled with electoral tallying, result transmission, and the management of election-related conflicts. These failures have repeatedly led to contested outcomes and national instability.

One of the most glaring weaknesses has been the tallying of presidential results. In past elections, media houses were abruptly barred from transmitting real-time results, fueling suspicion of manipulation. In 2027, transparency must be a priority. Election preparedness is not just the responsibility of the government. Communities must also engage in peace building initiatives well before the election period.

Dr Mokua is the executive director of Loyola Centre for Media and Communication