Election 2027: Why a people-focused policy agenda should take centre stage
Opinion
By
Dennis Kabaara
| Feb 10, 2026
Voters queue at a polling station in Lakisama, Ruaraka Constituency on August, 9, 2022. [File. Standard]
Kenyans tend to have short memories, so many have already forgotten about last year’s multiple “buy-elections” and the likely signals they were sending about the main event in 2027.
To recap, these were a couple of personal observations made at the time. Expectedly, the current regime will throw everything into 2027. Remembering the incumbency experiences of 2007 and 2017, it’s as existential as it gets, which suggests two pathways; pre to post-election violence, or basic elimination of the competition.
The regime seems almost haughtily confident that they have already won the election by whatever means necessary.
Relatedly, the thought occurred that 2027 looks increasingly unattractive to the ordinary voter, including younger voters. A suppressed 16 million vote serves the incumbency far better than a 22 million wave. Especially since, for the first time in a generation (excluding 2002), Raila Odinga will not be on the ballot.
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The other thought that came to mind at the time is the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) seems completely out of its depth. Yes, today we still have 546 days, or 78 weeks, to go but you can feel the general state of unpreparedness in those quarters.
The only thing we seem to hear is the usual calls for a bigger budget for our outrageously expensive electoral process. This from a referee (IEBC) that has zero control of the fact that Kenya is already (or always?) in electioneering mode. This is the low-trust, third world politics we love to practice while expecting to become a high-trust, first world economy.
Of course, it’s the presidential election we are talking about here, even though the five others also matter. We could spend lots of time discussing individuals. Or spend better time debating their party agendas.
From the incumbency, we have new ideas every day. First it was the Bottom-Up Economic Transformation Agenda (BETA). Then a “First World” Agenda with its three national priorities and three enablers. Now we even have a four-pillar plan for Nairobi that’s supposed to be part of the larger first-world plan. That’s a Nairobi that is motorable, clean, water-adequate and lit up as it leads our drive into the future.
Notwithstanding the question of if we should fix Nairobi to fix Kenya or (in my view) vice versa, the first impression is one of great ambition. The more lasting one is we have a regime that can’t stop promising.
From the “United Opposition” we have heard little to nothing, as the incumbent constantly reminds us. Making the heroic assumption that they are thinking as one, you get the feeling they have not fully internalised what the incumbent has done or is promising, or what they would do differently and better.
The most that one surmises is they will have an “anti-incumbent” agenda; which could mean anything from better programme implementation (the incumbent’s ideas were good, execution was bad) to major policy reversals (the incumbent’s ideas were bad to begin with). In the extreme, back to our 2022 status quo.
Of course, this brings me back to my favoured view that we should decide “why and what” to vote for before determining “whom and why” to vote in. But it relies on political parties presenting us with US-style policy agendas and platforms to digest; UK-style manifestos might seem outdated for 2027.
Overall, however, we will get a menu of promises based on what they think we want, not what we think we need.
So, for 2027, why don’t we set out our own needs statement; the people’s policy agenda? And then mark everyone against this agenda; how they respond to what we need, not what they think we want?
Without laying out the specifics of this agenda, let’s consider some areas that might provide useful inputs.
The first area is the 10 long-term issues of Agenda Four of the National Dialogue and Reconciliation Agreement that followed the post-election violence of 2007/08. If we recall, Agenda One stopped the violence, Agenda Two was the humanitarian response to displacement and Agenda Three was the political settlement we called the Grand Coalition.
As said before, Agenda Four was about “root and branch” (structural) not “cookie-cutter” (procedural) reform. A new Constitution was only one of these ten issues.
Police reform, parliamentary reform, Executive/civil service reform, judicial reform and land reform were the next five issues, followed by poverty, inequity and regional imbalances (partly addressed by devolution); unemployment, especially among the youth; consolidation of national cohesion and unity; and transparency, accountability and impunity (read, corruption). We got a new Constitution and judicial reform, but what else? Across the remaining eight items, there is substantial work that must be done.
The second area is Kenya Vision 2030, which was adopted as part of the 2008 settlement (unknown to many, the alternative — a joint Grand Coalition Government manifesto — was initially crafted but eventually dropped).
Since 2013, we have consistently seen attempts to “escape” the Vision, first in Jubilee’s 2013 Manifesto, then in its 2017 one, before it quietly reappeared, post-election, as the “Big Four Agenda”.
The current administration afforded similar lip service to the Vision, it took 18 months of internal kicking and screaming to shoehorn BETA into the Fourth Medium-Term Plan (MTP IV – 2023-2027). What we are looking for here is an understanding of progress on the Vision’s 25 goal statements, and a completion path.
The third area is that UDA-ODM 10-point Memorandum of Understanding if we read it as a national, and not simply inter-parties, compact.
Yes, it’s initial expiry date is this March, but it’s worth hearing how the nine non-National Dialogue Committee (NADCO) issues — inclusivity, devolution, youth livelihoods, leadership and integrity, national debt, corruption, the right to protest and compensation, government wastage and inefficiency and general rule of law and constitutionalism will be handled as a matter of daily business.
If we were being really hard, we might even go back to the nine issues under the 2018-2020 Building Bridges Initiative national ethos; divisive politics; ethnic antagonism and competition; inclusivity; shared prosperity; rights with responsibilities; corruption as a way of life; devolution’s viability and public safety and security.
The fourth and final area is the most obvious, and it brings the other three together. The question is simple: how will you implement the Constitution, as your policy guide, legal instruction and social contract?
Now, is it possible to mix these thoughts up and churn them into The people’s policy agenda for 2027?