Kenya's Jekyll and Hyde moment: Bright on paper, broken on practice

In a Kenya of contrasts, we have big dreams and big realities. Let’s use recent events to illustrate.

Last week we learnt at the launch of a national conversation beyond 2030 that the political pillar, at 88.2 per cent implementation, scored highest of Vision 2030’s constituent elements; outpacing foundations and enablers at 61.6 per cent, the social pillar at 59.5 per cent and the economic pillar at 55.5 per cent.  Yet, in the same week we observed incendiary diatribes across the political divide while witnessing more “goonism” as 2027 looms large amidst our first world reverie. 

This is our “Jekyll and Hyde” condition; nice things on paper, to be ignored in practice.  It is our elite dual personality; civic in the light, primordial in the night.  The ordinary people simply follow.

For the record, passing the constitution and rolling out devolution, the key explanatory reasons for the high score, were not all that Vision 2030’s political pillar demanded.  Even for those of us jumping up and down about a national development law to embed any future vision, just take a look at Sessional Paper Number 10 of 2012, our policy - on Kenya Vision 2030, which sought, for this pillar, “a democratic political system that is issue-based, people-centred, results-oriented and accountable to the public”.  That’s what a proper scorecard, or evaluation, should look at.

This Vision 2030 policy paper, which was never a “suggestion” as the President claimed at the launch (unless policy these days is “suggestive”), set out sub-visions for 2030 under six strategic thrusts in this political pillar.  Here are the first five, excluding security reclassified as an enabler.

On rule of law, “adherence to the rule of law applicable to a modern, market-based economy in a human rights-respecting state”.  On electoral and political processes, “ genuinely competitive and issue-based politics”.  On democracy and public participation, “a people-centred and politically-engaged open society”.  On transparency and accountability, “transparent, accountable, ethical and results-oriented institutions”.  On public administration and service delivery, “policy-driven and service-oriented institutions”.  This is where to qualitatively test that 88.2 per cent.

Simply, if our politics was so bright we would need dark sunglasses, not rose-tinted spectacles!

Our real issue is we measure performance on inputs applied (resources/money) or completed activities/initiatives, not actual outputs (improved service delivery or utilization) or outcomes (enhanced household welfare or human wellbeing).  We don’t ask the “so what” question from one level to the next.  Apply this question to any government scorecard, and you will see this.

So I take the overall Vision 2030 implementation score of 66.2 per cent (a simplistic, unweighted average of the constituent scores above) presented at the launch with a huge pinch of salt.  Which is not to say the launch didn’t have its moments.  Professor Hino’s GDP per capita contrast between Kenya and Singapore today was exactly the honest “picture of today” versus “picture of tomorrow” missing from the official mindset, especially since, as he demonstrated in the simple way that only experts can, this is how we begin to think about how we get “from here to there”. 

Yes, we have a history; we have done, and are doing, things, we have missed others, we have challenges, the rain has beaten us blah blah, yet, at the end of the day, where are we right now?

The other great moment came from the young lady, a strategist and poet in the final panel, who offered the closest we get to the people’s picture of tomorrow: about the simple things in life that every Kenyan looks forward to as a demand-side ask to which the supply-side government must respond.  As we have been told before, development is about people (watu) not things (vitu).

One downside to the launch was it isn’t evident if the way forward is multi-stakeholder-led or parliament-led.  And the official thinking seems to be so foggy that it isn’t clear if it’s the national development process we need to entrench in law (like the PFM act for budgeting), or the national development vision/charter document itself (a step up from Vision 2030 as embedded policy).

Even for those of us who are optimistic about a long-term vision, the “red herring” fear is real.

This administration already has 200-plus promises in its 2022 manifesto, hundreds of car sunroof declarations, NADCO and the 10 point UDA-ODM agenda and 305 outcomes and 1,522 outputs under MTP IV/BETA 2023-2027 to account for to Kenyans before 2027, or post-2030 dreaming.

Especially when you turn to the lesser-spotted event of last week: the launch of the 2026 Budget Review and Outlook Paper (BROP).   For all of the beautiful words and fancy promises we get from the leadership, everything rests on numbers; in this case, the fiscal outlook for 2027/28.

We will cover this in greater detail in the next article, but it is likely that markets are gasping.  Public spending is bloated up to Sh5.3 trillion (from Sh4.9 trillion as the latest 2026/27 projection, and Sh4.5 trillion in 2025/26).  A “cloud cuckoo-land” revenue projection of Sh3.9 trillion (from Sh3.4 trillion as the 2026/27 projection and Sh3.2 trillion in 2025/26).  Within this revenue, a tax take of Sh3.1 trillion (Sh2.8 trillion projected for current 2026/27 against Sh2.5 trillion in 2025/26).  A third consecutive deficit above Sh1.2 trillion, though falling to 6 per cent of GDP (before grants) from projected 6.4 per cent in 2026/27 and 6.9 per cent in 2025/26.  And, yet again, given the government’s apparent standoff with the IMF over their governance and anti-corruption diagnostic on us, plus some external market wariness, more crowding-out domestic borrowing.

For the record, the Kenya Kwanza (KK) manifesto targeted a deficit of 3 per cent by 2026/27 (this year).  Don’t forget the National Infrastructure Fund and securitization were supposed to relieve borrowing pressures.  But there is no end in sight in the borrowing cycle, especially when it isn’t just borrowing from Peter to pay Paul (refinancing) but actual new borrowing that’s growing our debt mountain.  Forget fiscal consolidation, think fiscal compromise.  You can bet that this wasn’t discussed at last week’s broad-based parliamentary echo chamber, sorry, retreat.

Yet here is the wild irony.  By June 2027, Kenya Kwanza will have grown the economy (63 per cent) just slower than debt (68 per cent) in this term.   By comparison, Jubilee’s first term debt (142 per cent) grew almost twice as fast as its relatively faster-expanding economy (77 per cent).

When we look at revenue and expenditure Jubilee (76 per cent and 90 per cent respectively) will also have grown faster than KK’s (60 per cent and 61 per cent) but with far greater imbalance.

It’s the relative Jubilee vs KK growth in debt and spending (142 vs 68 per cent; 90 v 61 per cent) that explains today’s debt stress more than the economy and revenue (77 vs 63 per cent, 76 per cent versus 60 per cent).  Conversely, KK’s expansion numbers - economy 63 per cent, debt 68 per cent, revenue 60 per cent, expenditure 61 per cent, reflect stability relative to the wilder Jubilee moment but lack the exciting multiplier returns on investment through spending and debt.

This is the difference for Kenyans wary of “macro-babble” or sceptical of future visions.  Might the concern be the cost of “unreformed” government driving up the cost of money, driving up the cost of tax compliance and doing business, driving up the cost of living, hence the cost of labour cycling back to cost of doing business then living? Before we add cost of public discontent on one hand, and cost of sovereign risk on the other?  Tomorrow’s dreams; Today’s reality