The fall of Ford-Kenya: How Wetang'ula's political fortress Is crumbling

From its historic role in Kenya’s multiparty struggle to mounting pressure from UDA and rebellion in Bungoma, Ford-Kenya faces a defining test of its political survival.

For a party that helped shape Kenya’s return to multiparty democracy, Ford-Kenya is confronting an uncomfortable question: Is it surviving on history rather than present strength?

The party has weathered leadership battles, defections and shifting alliances. But its latest challenge is more fundamental: preserving its identity, regional influence and bargaining power within a ruling coalition increasingly dominated by UDA.

At the centre of the storm is party leader and National Assembly Speaker Moses Wetang’ula. His political longevity has sustained Ford-Kenya, but it has also exposed the party’s dependence on his personal influence.

The latest challenge came from Kimilili MP Didmus Barasa, a UDA loyalist who publicly distanced himself from Wetang’ula’s political direction in Bungoma. Barasa questioned the benefits the community has received from the Speaker’s decades in politics.

His rebellion exposes a key weakness: If politicians can remain loyal to President William Ruto while openly challenging Ford-Kenya’s leadership in its traditional stronghold, how much control does the party retain over its future?

Ford-Kenya emerged from the struggle against President Daniel arap Moi’s one-party rule in the early 1990s. Disagreements over the presidential candidature split the original movement in 1992, with Kenneth Matiba leading Ford-Asili while Jaramogi Oginga Odinga retained FORD-Kenya.

Jaramogi’s death in 1994 triggered another leadership contest between his son Raila Odinga and Michael Kijana Wamalwa. Raila later left to establish the National Development Party, while Wamalwa guided Ford-Kenya into the National Rainbow Coalition that defeated Kanu in 2002.

After Wamalwa died in 2003, Musikari Kombo took over. Wetang’ula later consolidated his position, becoming party leader in 2011. Kombo’s departure, alongside Eugene Wamalwa, to establish New Ford-Kenya showed how internal disputes repeatedly weakened the party.

Wetang’ula nevertheless maintained Ford-Kenya’s relevance through CORD, NASA and Kenya Kwanza, using coalition negotiations to secure influence despite the party’s limited national electoral strength.

But surviving political storms is not the same as building a strong institution.

Political critic Jeff Wambulwa believes the party has abandoned the participatory politics that once defined it.

“Ford-Kenya of then was a party of the people, by the people,” he says, arguing that concentrated authority has weakened its internal structures.

His criticism suggests that the party’s vulnerability stems not only from UDA’s growing influence but also from its failure to give members a meaningful stake in its future.

Pressure for smaller Kenya Kwanza affiliates to dissolve into UDA has exposed Ford-Kenya’s uncertain position within the ruling coalition.

The 2022 alliance helped Ruto win the presidency, while Wetang’ula secured the National Assembly speakership. However, efforts to consolidate the coalition ahead of the 2027 elections threaten the smaller parties’ independence.

Ford-Kenya Secretary-General John Chikati rejected dissolution early this year, saying: “Ford Kenya cannot and will not be dissolved. It can only be enhanced and protected for future generations.”

Political risk analyst Dismas Mokua believes Wetang’ula is unlikely to surrender the party.

“Probability of Wetangula dissolving Ford Kenya is almost zero given his 2032 presidential interests as well as need to maintain strategic autonomy,” Mokua says.

He argues that Ruto’s priority is securing another presidential term rather than eliminating disagreements among coalition partners.

“President Ruto isn’t bothered by coalition turbulence if such turbulence does not affect the presidential vote and parliamentary strength,” he says.

For Ford-Kenya, the challenge is remaining useful to Ruto without becoming politically dispensable.

The dispute between Wetang’ula and Didmus Barasa has brought these contradictions into the open. Barasa has questioned Wetang’ula’s political allegiances, the distribution of opportunities within Kenya Kwanza and the involvement of relatives and associates in regional political contests. These remain allegations requiring responses from those implicated.

“Leadership demands ideological coherence and strategic clarity,” Barasa said.

“Bungoma is not a monarchy. It is a democracy premised on merit, competition, and the sovereign will of the people, not hereditary succession,” he added.

The remarks shift the debate beyond Wetang’ula’s national standing to who should shape Bungoma’s political future.

Crucially, Barasa is challenging Wetang’ula while remaining aligned with Ruto. This creates a problem for Ford-Kenya because its regional authority is being contested from within the same governing coalition it helped establish.

Wambulwa believes Barasa has developed an independent political following.

“Didmus is being rated because of the one-on-one relationship he has created with the people of Bungoma from before, regardless of the party,” he says.

“His loyalty to President Ruto is permanent and non-negotiable,” he adds, arguing that Barasa must also pursue his own ambitions.

Mokua, however, cautions against interpreting the fallout as proof that Wetang’ula has lost his influence.

“Didmus Barasa is a pragmatic politician and has a record of taking political decisions that maximize his political capital,” he says.

Mokua views Barasa’s calculations as primarily linked to local ambitions, particularly the gubernatorial contest, rather than a direct attempt to replace Wetang’ula as the region’s political kingpin.

Nevertheless, repeated challenges from politicians within the ruling alliance could weaken Ford-Kenya’s ability to coordinate candidates and negotiate political bargains.

The 2027 governor contest could provide the clearest indication of whether Ford-Kenya retains its traditional influence.

Bungoma remains closely associated with the party through Wetang’ula and Governor Kenneth Lusaka. Potential contenders include Barasa, Westlands MP Tim Wanyonyi and former governor Wycliffe Wangamati, who has been associated with the Linda Mwananchi political current.

The eventual candidates and party tickets remain subject to negotiations. Still, the contest raises questions about whether Ford-Kenya can produce a competitive candidate without relying heavily on Wetang’ula’s personal influence.

Wambulwa argues that the party has neglected grassroots organisation and leadership development.

“Everything is almost not working in the party,” he says, criticising the concentration of authority within a small circle.

He describes the party’s grassroots engagement as inadequate: “Ford-Kenya hasn’t rebranded, zero grassroots engagements, zero party activities, just PR.”

Mokua warns against measuring political strength through rallies alone.

“Crowds at political rallies cannot be used as a metric. Crowds are necessary but not sufficient,” he says.

According to him, genuine strength lies in structures capable of converting support into votes.

“A party in Kenya is anchored by polling station agents, clan endorsements, and small donations from registered members,” he says.

The argument places responsibility on Wetang’ula to demonstrate that Ford-Kenya retains the organisation needed to compete in 2027.

Can Wetang’ula Rescue the Party?

Wetang’ula remains nationally influential through his speakership, experience and relationships across successive administrations. But his personal standing does not automatically guarantee the party’s electoral strength.

Wambulwa believes the leadership must account for its achievements and reconnect with supporters.

“Wetangula and the party should get back to the people with a score card, showing and proving how they have successfully changed the people and the promises they’ve fulfilled,” he says.

He warns that recovery depends on rebuilding public confidence.

“Its recovery is solely determined by the people, which I think must get proper reasons from the party of why they should support the party again or we will term that as the party’s political extinction,” Wambulwa says.

Mokua similarly urges Wetang’ula to strengthen the party rather than surrender to political pressure. He recommends that the leader “invigorate party structures, identify solid and credible candidates for 2027 General Election, secure a post-coalition deal with president Ruto.”

The possible path forward includes credible candidates, transparent nominations, functioning grassroots branches and tangible evidence of what the party has delivered. Without these changes, Ford-Kenya risks retaining its name while its political ambitions are pursued through competing platforms.

The fall may not be sudden, but it could be decisive. Ford-Kenya has survived the fragmentation of the original Ford movement, Raila Odinga’s departure, the Kombo-Wetang’ula contest and successive national alliances. But history becomes a burden when past achievements substitute for present relevance.

The central question is no longer simply whether Wetang’ula can retain his speakership or relationship with Ruto. It is whether he can build an institution capable of surviving beyond his personal political calculations.

Mokua believes the party remains dormant rather than finished, while Wambulwa sees an organisation weakened by centralised leadership, limited grassroots engagement and competing political vehicles.

For a party born out of the struggle for political choice, there would be no greater irony than becoming a name remembered more for its history than for its future.