Nairobi County leadership failure not isolated, its systemic problem

It must be very difficult to be a voter in Nairobi. For three consecutive election cycles, it appears the gubernatorial choices for city voters have been a jinxed outcome. During the inaugural devolved system of government in 2013, the choice seemed easy: between a corporate honcho and a street veteran.

Unfortunately, Governor Kidero ended up a great disappointment, even to the city business community that had argued Nairobi was too important to be left to a street charlatan. In 2017, the hoi polloi ganged up against the business community, crossed the political divides of the time and elected Mike Sonko Mbuvi, a self-confessed street mafia, as city boss.

On the streets, Sonko remained popular until the invisible hand of the real city mafia decided he was not good enough to do business with. According to him, he was forced to sign the transfer of key functions of the County Government while intoxicated. His detractors eventually succeeded in locking him in prison for several months over corruption allegations. However, to his supporters, his only crime was revealing privileged information in public about the then-ruling elites when he fell out of favour with them.

For city electorates, Governor Johnson Sakaja’s arrangement with the national government is another betrayal of the city.

Fattened for slaughter

This column will not delve into the legalities of the signed cooperation agreement between the two levels of government for obvious reasons. Our learned friends are better placed to respond to the emerging public interest concerns.

Of interest for this article today is whether there is anything to celebrate here for city residents. For a balanced analysis, we shall make reference to the objects of devolution, look at past precedents and my experiences as a practitioner in the devolution space since 2013.

According to Articles 174–175 of the Constitution, the primary reasons for our devolved governance structure are to promote democratic self-governance, reduce disparities in development across regions, ensure equitable sharing of resources raised nationally, protect the rights of minorities and allow communities the right to determine how they are governed, among others.

The Governor’s position is the executive arm at the county level, enjoying certain powers and privileges similar to those of the President, albeit within a smaller geographic jurisdiction and lacking exclusively national government functions such as security, foreign services and post-early childhood education. Therefore, if voters in the city elect their Governor, there is a legitimate expectation that the person elected into that office is their choice, at least until completion of their term or until any of the other conditions contemplated under the Constitution for vacating office are fulfilled.

Article 187 allows for transfer of functions between the two levels of government only if the receiving entity can perform them more efficiently and it is not legally prohibited. The purpose of such a transfer is to enhance service delivery when a level of government cannot perform a function efficiently on its own. Such a transfer must be formalised and published in the Kenya Gazette to ensure compliance.

It is this Article that former President Uhuru Kenyatta used to transfer four key functions — including health, transport, public works and planning — from Nairobi City County Government to the Nairobi Metropolitan Services (NMS) and appointed a military general to run it.

The questions for debate here are: did the NMS fare any better in service delivery on the said functions compared to the Sonko administration? Do city residents have any memorable results they can attribute to this era? How did such an arrangement impact established governance systems, staff management and performance, the oversight obligations of the County Assembly and accountability to the primary stakeholders — the electorates?

According to available data, NMS was allocated a total of Sh46.3 billion for the two years that Lt Gen Mohamed Badi was its Director General. When it wound up its operations in September 2022, it left behind an estimated Sh16 billion in pending bills. The national government allocated it Sh3.2 billion to clear the bills shortly after President Ruto took power. He had promised to end NMS operations if he won the election and not interfere with the management of the city.

Social media postings from September 2022 indicate NMS constructed 20 hospitals, facilitated ICUs, sank 193 boreholes and acquired 13 ambulances. I believe the people of Nairobi are competent enough to evaluate the budgetary allocations vis-à-vis the presumed outcomes. For this column, value for money would be a legitimate question to ask of NMS.

The NMS was in office for about two years before the general election. Curiously, the current cooperation framework has been signed about two years to the next general election and has lined up at least Sh80 billion for the proposed programmes. In endorsing the framework, a section of city MPs have cited that the cooperation is under Article 189 of the Constitution and Section Six of the Cities and Urban Areas Act.

True, Article 189 mandates the two levels of government to cooperate, but also to respect the functions and institutional integrity of each other. By virtue of this Article, the two levels should promote mutual cooperation and support, form joint committees to enhance policy coordination, or resolve conflicts through alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. Section Six of the Cities and Urban Areas Act recognises Nairobi as the country’s capital and provides a framework for its unique governance, management and partnership.

The legitimate question to ask here is: are unilateral encroachments by the national government, without the involvement of city voters or their elected representatives, the solution?

According to summary details of the framework posted on the official X handle of President Ruto, the Sh80 billion committed by the national government is targeting key infrastructure in water, sewerage and waste management, electricity, street lighting and intra-ward road networks.

From an analytical point of view, one side of me leans towards optimism that the deal is well-intentioned to improve the welfare of city residents. However, history and analytical instinct tell me we must scratch further beyond the lofty speeches and political promises. For starters, while the national government promises to inject billions into water, electricity and sewerage improvements, we must not forget that there are two commercial public entities that provide these services at market prices.

For instance, it is Kenya Power’s commercial business to install transformers, and Nairobi City Water and Sewerage Company’s core business is to provide clean and safe water for residents and sewerage services. Will the two companies be the procuring entities under this arrangement? How many billions have been lost in previous street lighting and CCTV camera misadventures in the city?

The arrangement establishes a joint committee between the two levels of government under Prime CS Musalia Mudavadi, who will oversee the Sh80 billion from the national government, plus additional allocations from the county. Will oversight lie with the National Assembly or the Nairobi County Assembly?

History reminds us to be very wary of billions lined up under clandestine arrangements, especially around an electioneering period. Furthermore, the grapevine in recent days has been awash with news of ruthless fights over garbage contract billions between county officials and powerfully connected politicians.

More fundamentally, does it mean that voters in Nairobi are incapable of electing an able governor to run the county government as a capital city?

Many cities around the world have such men and women as leaders. Why not Nairobi? Or does Nairobi provide a snippet into the low quality of county leadership across the rest of the 46 counties?