Down memory lane: Why elections have always been a nail biting affair

He stepped on my thigh and pushed the muzzle of his rifle onto my chest. His armed colleague cocked his gun and stood at the door. “Kaa chini wee mjinga (sit down you fool)” he commanded pushing his gun deeper into my flesh. I sat still, fuming but helpless. The local chief produced five membership cards of the ruling party and ordered my father to part with 50 shillings, ‘or else’. 

My father, a tall dark muscular man sat still. He didn’t utter a word. He quietly observed the intruders before gently asking them; “Is this the best way to go about recruiting party members?” he received a slap for his question. Two-armed administration policemen had barged into our one room house in Nakuru’s Kivumbini estate. They were accompanied by the local chief. Their mission? To forcefully recruit us into the membership of the ruling political party then. 

A long moment of threats, intimidation and occasional silence followed. Soon tension was growing outside as crowds gathered. The youth began arming themselves with stones while shouting; “Akina kale wamevamiwa (Kales are under attack)”. The chief realised that soon he would have to deal with a whole angry estate population.  He ordered the APs to leave.

The Kenyan electoral system has undergone a major evolution. In 1974 candidates couldn’t be elected to Parliament without an election symbol. Kanu had total control and cunningly locked out those considered hostile to the party.

Party symbols to be used for the elections would be kept secret and only be revealed to the candidates at the eleventh hour to knock out unwanted contestants.

Former Butere MP Martin Shikuku, told me that: “Some of us did not know what our symbols were until the last day. We would then rush to print posters. My opponent had been informed of the symbol a week earlier. He told the people I wasn’t vying. There were many who simply gave up because they lacked the nerve to fight.” 

During the 1969 General Election, some candidates had their own ballot boxes. In 1974, J.M Kariuki, Nyandarua North MP, complained that: “Anybody could carry as many votes as he could in his pocket and put them in the ballot box.” The system allowed and enabled people with influence and money to rig themselves into parliament. 

Candidates were required to present themselves before the electoral body. Many would disappear only to be found after their rivals had been declared winners. Kidnappings thrived during election time. After elections, ballot papers would be transferred to the district headquarters for counting. Many ballot papers would disappear. 

In Kanu’s enthusiasm to be in control and manage the electoral process, many people suffered grave harm. If a powerful figure put in a good word for you, then you were assured of getting a Kanu ticket.  

When DCs were Returning Officers 

By 1988, Kanu had reached the peak of its power with Moi celebrating his 10th anniversary as president. He became emboldened after the failed August 1, 1982 military coup against his government. He neutralised those he perceived a threat to his leadership. Then, he embarked on a massive campaign to make Kanu an all-powerful machine. For its party nominations, the party introduced Mlolongo. 

Voters lined up behind the photos of their preferred candidates. District Commissioners (DCs), acted as the returning officers. They would move along the queues loudly counting the voters. If a candidate was not popular with the party, his or her queue would be declared the loser, even if it was the longest. The DC would pause at the same spot and continue counting imaginary voters. He would then declare the shortest line as the winner. 

During the queuing, those who garnered more than 70 per cent of the “standing votes” were declared winners. More than 50 per cent of the Kanu die-hards were elected to parliament through this dirty system. At the party nominations in February 1988, only Kanu members were allowed to participate. The rest of Kenyans were expected to vote in the national poll in March. 

Mlolongo achieved its key objective of cleaning up Kanu. The then Vice President Mwai Kibaki, and government critics; Martin Shikuku, Charles Rubia and Kimani wa Nyoike were among those thrown out. Kibaki is popularly remembered to have angrily said “even rigging required some intelligence”. He was soon dropped as Moi’s deputy and appointed minister for health. 

Martin Shikuku once told me that; “It is the infamous Kanu disciplinary committee and the 1988 Mlolongo elections that eventually destroyed Kanu”     

In 1991, Moi appointed a Kanu Review Committee to investigate the party’s internal electoral and disciplinary conduct. The committee chaired by Vice President Professor George Saitoti traversed the country collecting views and opinions from citizens. Recommendations by the Saitoti Committee led to the 1991 repeal of section 2A of the Constitution of Kenya, allowing the reintroduction of multi-partyism. Kanu initiated internal changes as it prepared for the first multiparty elections in 1992.   

Opposition politicians-initiated campaigns to sell their democracy agenda. Sparks of violence started to light up embers across the country. Opposition supporters were teargassed and violently dispersed. 

Politically instigated violence broke out in Nyanza and Western Kenya. Meanwhile, Kanu launched the Youth for Kanu92, (YK92), to promote the party among the youth. Money was literally poured in millions of shillings to buy support. Government officials from chiefs to district officers and district commissioners, vigorously campaign for Moi and Kanu. 

Time of Zacchaeus Chesoni 

Moi had appointed lawyer Zacchaeus Chesoni to take charge of the electoral management body the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK), to preside over the 1992 general elections. This was Kenya’s first multiparty election. Chesoni, who later became the country’s Chief Justice, was once described by Senior Counsel Paul Muite as a man possessing; a “first class legal mind” who wrote “judgements that were in a class of their own”.

The humorous and at times reflective Chesoni once told me that those who called him an election thief and accused him of helping Moi win the 1992 and 1997 elections, were fools who fail to look at issues critically. 

“When Moi says he’s the professor of politics, he actually means it. We have all these men and women in opposition who are more learned than Moi but are stuck in deep political stupidity. How can they flood the presidential polls with opposition candidates and gobble between themselves enough votes to remove Moi yet claim to have been rigged?” asked Chesoni. 

The 1992 polls attracted four main candidates: Moi, Kenneth Matiba, Mwai Kibaki and Oginga Odinga. Since Kenya is highly ethnic in its voting; Odinga captured the Luo block and shared some Luhya spoils with Kenneth Matiba. Matiba split the Kikuyu vote with Kibaki and took Embu while Kibaki clung to Meru. Meanwhile, Moi pocketed the Kalenjin vote, and captured the Kamba and Somali voting blocs. He also ate into the Kisii and Mijikenda areas.  Moi got slightly over one third of the total vote. The opposition trio shared the two thirds. Moi polled, 1.9 million votes out of the 5.3 million. Matiba had 1.4 million, Kibaki 1 million and Odinga about 900,000 votes. In their greed and disunity, opposition candidates would always scatter votes. 

Chesoni said that opposition leaders were mesmerised by media coverage and huge crowds that turned up at their political rallies.

They rarely invested in Kanu zones or party agents. And since they were starved of resources, they could barely afford placing election observers in Kanu strongholds. 

Chesoni laughed off claims that he stole elections for Moi. “Many have said that I stole the 1992 and 1997, elections for Moi. The National Tallying Centre at the KICC was flooded with the media, both local and international, plus observers who were even more than election officials.

There is no way anyone could possibly have cooked figures here. Moi always won elections because he was smatter than his rivals” Said Chesoni 

The 1997 General Election, still under Chesoni’s eye were no different. Kanu won 107 national assembly seats out of 210. Moi further appointed 12 others to Parliament. That year, the opposition had fielded 14 candidates.

Chesoni was right, the greed, selfishness of opposition leaders had replayed itself out once more in 1997. 

Samuel Kivuitu    

Moi was leaving the political scene into retirement in 2002. His preferred Kanu candidate Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta faced a united opposition. After years of bickering, the opposition at last came under one umbrella and gave Kanu a resounding defeat. Mwai Kibaki became Kenya’s third president. 

The 2002 elections were peaceful and forceful. Voters turned out in their millions to cast a vote of no confidence against Kanu, a party that had tormented them for close to four decades. That year, I voted with a smile as I recalled the lunchtime intrusion by armed APs. Samuel Kivuitu declared his friend Kibaki President elect and the swearing in ceremony at Nairobi’s Uhuru Park was chaotic. 

Kivuitu settled well in office and started preparing for the 2007 elections. The electoral cycle had to stay active. Kibaki took over and was soon embroiled in battles of betrayal with his political colleagues. Kenyans were still agitating for political change and constitutional reviews. The journey that started in 1991 was picking up steam. 

The Bomas conference 

Moi had put together a committee of scholars through the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (CKRC), under Prof Yash Pal Ghai, and activists to consult widely and draft a constitution for consideration by Kenyans. Thus, the Bomas Conference was born. Hundreds of stakeholders would meet every day with, legislators, and Kenyans from all corners to discuss useful constitutional changes. 

When Kibaki took over power, he was in favour of the Bomas draft which proposed a parliamentary system as opposed to a presidential one. The Bomas draft emphasised values such as; national unity, rule of law, democracy, participation, human rights and provision for the minorities, good governance, integrity, transparency and accountable development. 

Prof Yas Pal Ghai says Kenya had started off on the wrong footing: “Jomo Kenyatta and Moi had no respect for the rule of law, a central virtue of the constitution giving us independence. Politics ceased to be about policies but instruments of violence.” Kibaki, it seems, had learned well from his predecessors.  

As Kibaki settled in office, his love shifted towards the executive presidential system. Says Ghai: “Having defeated Moi’s chosen successor, Uhuru, in 2002, had began to realise the virtues of the presidential system that gave him as President so much power.” Soon, Kibaki and his government killed the Bomas draft. His team butchered the Bomas draft, squeezing in the presidential system. It is this tainted draft that was rejected by Kenyans at the 2005 constitutional referendum which Kivuitu successfully midwifed. 

Ghai says the 2007 General Election were therefore held under the old constitution that Moi left in place complete with its imperial presidency. It led to discrimination, ethnicity driven deceits and conflicts. The 2007 election campaigns ran on ethnic lines of Kikuyus vs Luos. Historian Charles Hornsby says that during the 2007 campaigns: “Raila Odinga personified a popular movement for radical change, while Kibaki was positioned as leader of a reactionary, tribalist, old guard that had mismanaged Kenya in the past.” 

Ironically, Kibaki had destroyed the Bomas draft that had sought to eliminate ethnic conflict in Kenya. Hornby says that: “Kenya cracked apart in the worst outbreak of ethnic violence in the country’s history.” Kibaki had succeeded not only in the killing of the Bomas constitution, but in nearly destroying the state of Kenya. 

An African team led by the Secretary General of the United Nations Kofi Annan eventually brought peace. Kofi strongly advised for the revival of the Bomas constitution, advise that the Kibaki team shot down. As Kivuitu carried the cross meant for Kibaki and fizzled into oblivion, Kibaki shook hands with Raila and continued enjoying State power. 

Wafula Chebukati’s reign 

Between 2009 and January 2017, Ahmed Isaack Hassan acted as Chairperson of IEBC. Then Wafula Chebukati took over. 

In his last appearance as the IEBC Chair, Chebukati detailed the numerous challenges the electoral body continues to face. Persistent late enactment or amendment of electoral laws too close to elections, always undermine planning and implementation of electoral activities. Since politicians run Kenya as their personal club, these delays are deliberate. 

During election season, some political players love filing cases in courts to influence commission decisions and operations. Some court pronouncements, are made too close to election date, affecting the commissions preparedness. Chebukati argued that: “It is imperative that amendments to the electoral laws are conducted at least two years to the election date to enable the commission plan and prepare for election on the basis of a settled legal framework.” 

Funding, he said, is another handicap to the commission. Elections is a process that follows a 5-year electoral cycle. The cycle continues from one election to the next. The commission funding has always been inadequate and unable to fully cover the cycle. The IEBC funding is provided by the National Treasury during the election year. After elections, funding is normally curtailed, constraining activities in subsequent phases of the election.

Chebukati had argued that some key activities are curtailed by irregular funding. These include; regular maintenance off election technology in readiness for subsequent general elections, continuous voter registration; voter education and staff capacity building.

Chebukati had hoped the new team would have it easier with funding. Section 18 of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission Act provides for the operation of the IEBC Fund. Politicians ensure it remains at their mercy.

Chebukati said his team drew many lessons from the 2017 general elections and repeat presidential poll. It had to align its approach to elections guided by the Supreme Court Judgement of the presidential petitions.

The team developed a strategic plan and an implementation mechanism that would incorporate the reasoning of the Supreme Court in the Presidential election petitions and recommendations arising from the 2017 post-election evaluation.     

“I exit the (IEBC), contended that we gave our best to this commission. We charted and weathered storms that threatened the existence of the commission. We endured relentless fatigue in our preparation for elections.

“We mastered higher courage to overcome the perils of democracy and we delivered the sacred will of the people of Kenya.” Said Chebukati, his baldness breaking into a farewell smile.

Kenya has a lot of cleaning up to do. The country needs an election environment devoid of harassment, intimidation and profiling. We need an environment that quickly corrects or stops the spread of falsehoods during an election year.

Falsehoods can be a recipe for tensions, unrest and chaos. Kenya should never return to the dark days of harassment and intrusion at the lunch hour.