Why Kenya should free the Treasury from grasp of State House

There is an old constitutional wisdom, born of struggle, that whoever controls the purse controls the state. Taxation and expenditure are political, moral, and philosophical choices that decide whose voices matter, whose roads are built, which hospitals function, and which communities are forgotten.

The purse is shielded from personal rule because once one office captures money, it becomes patronage fuel. In theory, Parliament debates budgets, approves appropriations, and runs oversight committees. In practice, the Treasury is tethered to the Executive. The President and his advisers set priorities, reward loyalty, punish dissent, and choreograph development, producing not centralised budgeting but an imperial presidency financed by taxpayers.

The call for an independent Treasury, voiced by leaders like Okiya Omtatah, is a structural correction to restore constitutional balance so public resources serve the republic, not the regime. In Kenya, development often follows political allegiance. Constituencies that align with the Executive are prioritised, while those deemed hostile starve. Roads stall, projects are delayed, and administrative bottlenecks multiply. The message is rarely spoken but widely understood. Loyalty attracts resources.

This is fiscal feudalism, not equal citizenship. Imagine a Treasury operating independently of Executive manipulation, with MPs formally petitioning Parliament for constituency projects. Inclusion in the national budget would depend on transparent criteria, need, equity, population, and economic impact, not proximity to power, and would be insulated from campaign calculations. It would not end politics. It would civilise it.

An independent Treasury would require institutional redesign. Its leadership would need security of tenure and insulation, like the Judiciary and independent commissions. Budget ceilings would follow objective frameworks grounded in equity and public participation. Parliamentary committees would have authority and rigorous oversight. Parliament is political and can be captured, but diffusion is safer than concentration.

Debated across 290 constituencies, fiscal power is harder for one office to weaponise for partisan survival, negotiations become more public and transparent, and citizens can hold MPs accountable for budget advocacy. An independent Treasury also restores the moral meaning of taxation. Our taxes are not political donations but civic obligations paid by boda boda riders, teachers, traders, farmers, and salaried workers. When redirected to entrench incumbency through selective projects, campaign season launches, or prestige constructions for political optics, the social contract fractures, citizens feel exploited, and equal development cannot exist where budget allocation is a reward system. Consider the recurring pattern. Before every election cycle, the Executive unveils sudden infrastructure commitments in strategic regions. Billions appear for stadiums, highways, or special funds. After elections, fiscal discipline returns, often with austerity that burdens the same citizens whose taxes financed the spectacle. This oscillation is political choreography, not economic prudence.

An independent Treasury would disrupt that choreography. If a constituency requires a road, its MP would submit a formal proposal through parliamentary processes. The proposal would be debated, evaluated against national priorities, and included through institutional channels. Development would become predictable, rules-based, and equitable. The President would still implement projects, but would not unilaterally determine who deserves them.

This is how mature democracies function. The Executive proposes and Parliament disposes. Kenya’s history warns of unchecked presidential control. From the single-party era to the present, centralised fiscal power has reinforced executive dominance. Even after the 2010 Constitution introduced devolution, the national Treasury authority remains a powerful lever.

Reclaiming the Treasury is reclaiming the republic. The question is constitutional necessity, not political convenience. If we desire equal development, accountable taxation, and genuine parliamentary authority, we must insulate public finance from personal power.