It's Museveni's seventh heaven, democracy's hell

When Uganda’s Electoral Commission chairperson Simon Byabakama declared President Yoweri Museveni the winner of the January 15 presidential election on Saturday, the announcement confirmed more than a disputed electoral outcome. It reaffirmed a political model that has defined Uganda’s governance for nearly four decades, and continues to shape power retention across much of Africa.

Museveni, 81, was declared president-elect with 71.6 per cent of the vote, after securing 7,946,772 ballots out of 11,144,201 valid votes cast, according to official results. His nearest challenger, Robert Kyagulanyi, popularly known as Bobi Wine, received 2,741,238 votes, or 24.72 per cent.

The result extends Museveni’s rule to more 40 years since he took power in 1986 and marks his seventh elected term. It places him firmly within a category of African leaders whose longevity has been sustained not merely by popular support, but by political systems that progressively narrow the space for genuine competition. With the declaration, Uganda enters yet another five-year cycle under the same leadership, following an election process already under intense domestic and international scrutiny.

Museveni’s extended rule places him among Africa’s longest-serving presidents of all time. Only a handful have governed longer: Teodoro Obiang of Equatorial Guinea (46 years), Paul Biya of Cameroon (43 years), Omar Bongo of Gabon (42 years), Muammar Gaddafi of Libya (42 years), and Denis Sassou Nguesso of Congo-Brazzaville (41 years).

Others on the list, such as Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, José Eduardo dos Santos of Angola, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and Omar al-Bashir of Sudan, were eventually removed from power not through elections, but via coups, uprisings or internal party revolts. Their exits came after long periods in which electoral processes continued to exist, but outcomes became increasingly predictable.

Despite differing ideologies and national histories, these leaders share common strategies of rule: constitutional amendments to remove term limits, politicisation of electoral institutions, loyalty of security forces, constrained media environments and the criminalisation of dissent. Uganda’s trajectory over the past two decades closely mirrors this pattern.

Presidential term limits were removed in 2005. Age limits were lifted in 2017 following a contentious parliamentary process marked by the presence of security forces. The Electoral Commission is appointed by the president. Public order laws restrict assembly, while media houses operate under constant threat of sanction. Elections continue to be held regularly, but the conditions under which they take place increasingly favour continuity over competition.

Against this backdrop, the 2026 election was less a contest over who would govern next than a confirmation of how power is retained.

The election unfolded amid heavy military deployment, a nationwide internet shutdown, and widespread claims of intimidation and procedural failures. Internet access, social media platforms, mobile data and mobile money services were switched off nationwide 48 hours ahead of polling and remained unavailable through vote tallying and the announcement of results.

Failing kits

The blackout significantly curtailed independent reporting and election observation. Journalists relied on phone calls, physical movement and sporadic SMS communication, while opposition parties reported difficulty coordinating polling agents or transmitting results from the field. Civil society organisations noted that the shutdown limited real-time verification of claims and counterclaims, leaving official channels largely uncontested.

Across several districts, including Kampala, Wakiso, Masaka, Gulu, Arua, Rubanda and Kakumiro, voters and party agents reported biometric voter verification kits failing, delayed arrival of polling materials, and voting starting hours behind schedule. In some opposition-leaning areas, polling reportedly did not begin until late morning or early afternoon, compressing voting time and discouraging turnout.

The Electoral Commission later acknowledged that some biometric machines malfunctioned, forcing a reversion to manual voter registers. Opposition leaders argued that the failures, combined with the communications blackout, disproportionately affected areas perceived to be hostile to the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM).

The election period was further overshadowed by claims of lethal force used by security agencies. Unverified accounts circulating among opposition networks alleged that at least 49 supporters affiliated with the National Unity Platform were shot dead by state operatives in areas including Luweero Triangle, Rubaga Division, Kyengera Town Council and Butambala.

The Uganda Red Cross Society confirmed it was responding to casualties related to election-related unrest, providing medical and humanitarian assistance, but declined to release casualty figures, citing neutrality and ongoing operations. Hospitals in several districts reported receiving patients with gunshot wounds and injuries associated with crowd dispersal.

Tensions escalated further after polling closed. On the night following the vote, heavily armed military and police units surrounded the home of Bobi Wine in Magere, on the outskirts of Kampala. Power was reportedly cut, some CCTV cameras were interfered with, and helicopters were seen hovering above the residence.

Ballot stuffing

Reports circulated that Wine had been abducted and airlifted to an unknown location, claims later denied by police as “deceitful and inciteful”. Wine subsequently issued a statement confirming that he had escaped the security operation and gone into hiding, while his wife, Barbara Kyagulanyi, and other family members remained under house arrest.

He rejected the election results, citing ballot stuffing, military interference, detention of polling officials and other electoral offences. “Those who make democracy impossible make resistance inevitable,” he said.

Yet beyond opposition circles, his post-election statements, largely disseminated through X, did not generate the scale of public mobilisation seen in previous cycles. Analysts noted that with internet access restricted and public assembly tightly controlled, expressions of dissent remained fragmented and largely symbolic.

For analysts of Ugandan politics, the events following the vote followed a familiar script. Journalist and political commentator Charles Onyango-Obbo has repeatedly observed that opposition leaders in Uganda face one of the most perilous political environments on the continent.

Writing on social media, Onyango-Obbo noted that once voting ends, security agencies routinely cordon off opposition leaders’ homes, restrict movement and communication, and prevent the mobilisation of legal or political challenges. In his words, Uganda’s electoral cycle often involves “the transition from candidate to prisoner”.

The experience of Dr Kizza Besigye, Museveni’s principal challenger for nearly two decades, offers a stark historical precedent. After contesting the 2001 election, Besigye fled into exile in South Africa following threats of arrest and violence. In 2006, upon returning to run again, he was arrested and charged with treason and rape weeks before polling, charges later dismissed but accompanied by repeated arrests.

In 2011, Besigye was violently assaulted during the “Walk to Work” protests and partially blinded by pepper spray, later requiring hospitalisation abroad. Following the 2016 election, his home was placed under prolonged security siege. Since November 2024, he has again been in detention.

When Bobi Wine emerged as the leading opposition figure in 2021, the same pattern resurfaced. After that election, security forces surrounded his home for 11 days, lifting the siege only after a court order. The events of January 2026 suggest that the approach has since been further entrenched.

Managed democracy

Comparative data from institutions such as Freedom House, Afrobarometer and the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project consistently show that long-serving regimes maintain the outward form of democracy while steadily eroding its substance.

Uganda exemplifies this model. Elections are competitive in appearance, but the cumulative effect of legal, administrative and security controls limits the possibility of alternation in power. Opposition participation persists, but under conditions that make victory increasingly implausible.

Afrobarometer surveys in Uganda consistently show high voter participation alongside widespread scepticism that elections reflect the will of the people, a contradiction common in dominant-party systems across the continent.

Museveni’s seventh term therefore highlights a persistent reality in African politics: elections are regularly held, but power rarely changes hands.