Kenya’s failed bid for the African Union Commission (AUC) chairmanship was not just a personal setback for Raila Odinga, it was a national diplomatic failure with significant geopolitical consequences.
While some have rushed to frame this loss as a personal defeat for Raila, the reality is far more sobering. This was not about an individual but about Kenya’s place at the high table of African leadership.
Securing the AUC chairmanship would have been more than a symbolic victory. It would have placed the country at the epicentre of Africa’s decision-making processes, shaping policies on economic integration, trade, security, and governance.
In a continent increasingly caught in the crosshairs of global power struggles between Western nations, China, and Russia, having a Kenyan at the helm would have given Kenya strategic advantage.
Instead, Kenya now finds itself sidelined, with another nation occupying this crucial position. This means decisions that directly impact Kenya’s economic, diplomatic, and security interests will now be shaped by leaders whose priorities may not necessarily align with Kenya’s. This is not a scenario any Kenyan should celebrate regardless of political affiliations.
At the heart of this failure was a fundamental miscalculation. Treating diplomacy as an extension of noisy, high-profile politics rather than the art of silent, strategic statecraft. Kenya’s campaign was loud, public, and at times overconfident—an approach that works well in electoral politics but falls short in the delicate world of international diplomacy.
From the moment Raila’s candidacy was announced, the government embarked on an energetic lobbying effort, complete with public declarations, media blitzes, and high-profile endorsements. President William Ruto himself led the charge, making open appeals to African leaders and positioning Raila as the most qualified candidate.
Unfortunately, AU elections do not operate on the principles of public endorsement alone. Unlike national elections, where voter persuasion happens in broad daylight, AU elections are decided in backroom negotiations, quiet diplomatic exchanges, and long-term strategic alliances.
Countries that have successfully secured AUC leadership in the past such as Chad and South Africa did so through well-orchestrated, behind-the-scenes diplomacy rather than overt political grandstanding.
Winston Churchill famously warned that those who fail to learn from history are doomed to repeat it.
Kenya’s failure to win the AUC seat is eerily similar to its 2017 loss when Amina Mohamed was defeated by Chadian Moussa Faki Mahamat. That loss should have been a learning opportunity, yet Kenya repeated the same mistakes: Inconsistent foreign policy positions, and a failure to recognise that AU elections are won in silence, not in spectacle.
Kenya’s inconsistent stance on key global issues such as Israel-Palestine war, the Russia-Ukraine war, USA-China trade wars, Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo crisis, and its increasing alignment with Western capitals raised questions about its reliability as an African leader.
Another baffling oversight was Kenya’s failure to learn from its recent diplomatic victory over Djibouti in the race for the United Nations Security Council non-permanent seat for 2021-2022. That campaign, led by seasoned diplomats such as Ambassador Macharia Kamau succeeded because it was methodical, quiet, and deeply strategic.
Why did the Raila campaign not plug into this recent over Djibouti? Was it hubris?
Equally instructive was South Africa’s 2012 campaign for Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, the only Anglophone candidate to have won the AUC race. South Africa's campaign was disciplined, calculated and built on years of strategic influence-building within the AU. Any serious campaign team should have studied this precedent in detail.
Another critical error was assuming that Kenya would enjoy automatic backing from its East African neighbours. In international diplomacy, regional solidarity is a key factor in determining success. However, rather than rallying behind Raila, East African nations were notably divided.
This lack of a united regional front weakened Kenya’s bargaining power and allowed rival candidates to consolidate support elsewhere. Kenya’s diplomatic machinery should have anticipated this challenge and worked years in advance to solidify its influence within the EAC.
-Dr Panya is a lecturer at Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology