Despite billions in funding, Kenya's watchdogs still struggle to bite

Sixteen years after the 2010 Constitution created a new architecture of independent commissions and offices, Kenya’s accountability institutions face a difficult verdict, they have produced notable investigations, prosecutions and recoveries, but persistent corruption, police abuses, ethnic profiling and political incitement continue to expose deep weaknesses.

The Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC), Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA), Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (ODPP) and National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) have received billions of shillings to perform roles considered central to protecting citizens and public resources.

The question is whether that investment has translated into accountability, as most Kenyans feel these bodies should be done away with.

 EACC offers some of the clearest evidence of both progress and limitation.

The commission has investigated major corruption cases, pursued asset recovery and secured convictions. In 2024/25, it reported 33 convictions, 54 cases finalised in court, recovery of assets worth Sh3.4 billion and 79 asset-recovery suits targeting property worth Sh4.8 billion.

Among its high-profile cases is the Sh588 million Kiambu County roads case involving former governor Ferdinand Waititu. EACC investigated the tender and forwarded the file to the ODPP.

In February 2025, the Anti-Corruption Court convicted Waititu and others after finding that he had obtained an indirect personal interest in a company that received the county road contract. The case showed that an investigation can move through prosecution to conviction, although it remains subject to appeal.

The John Waluke maize scandal provides another major test. The former Sirisia MP and his co-accused were prosecuted over a Sh297 million payment linked to a maize supply contract involving the National Cereals and Produce Board.

The case illustrates why trial-level convictions cannot automatically be treated as final accountability.

EACC also faces a structural limitation. Although constitutionally independent, it does not have the final power to prosecute the criminal cases it investigates. It forwards files to the ODPP, which independently decides whether the evidence meets the threshold for prosecution.

The separation can create an accountability gap when a case stalls. The public may know EACC investigated a matter but remain uncertain whether prosecutors declined it, sought more evidence or proceeded with charges.

EACC’s own finances have also faced scrutiny. Parliament’s Public Accounts Committee questioned the commission over the Sh1.518 billion acquisition of the Integrity Centre building, with auditors raising concerns over documentation and approvals.

The queries did not establish that the entire amount was lost, but raised questions about EACC’s own accountability.

The challenge is also whether investigations and recoveries are changing behaviour. EACC reported that the average bribe paid by Kenyans rose from Sh4,878 in 2024 to Sh6,724 in 2025, while only 14.6 per cent of respondents believed the government was committed to fighting corruption.

IPOA faces an equally difficult test.

Created to provide civilian oversight of the National Police Service, IPOA has investigated complaints involving police killings, torture, excessive force and other misconduct. Its role became particularly important during the 2024 Finance Bill protests and subsequent demonstrations.

By the end of 2025, IPOA had recorded 47 cumulative police convictions, while 245 cases remained before the courts.

The death of Albert Ojwang in police custody became one of the most prominent tests of police accountability. Ojwang died at Nairobi’s Central Police Station after his arrest in Homa Bay. An autopsy found injuries consistent with assault, contradicting the initial police account. IPOA investigated the circumstances surrounding his death, bringing renewed attention to questions of police command and accountability.

The shooting of Boniface Kariuki and the Rex Masai case, has similarly kept IPOA under scrutiny.

Yet the key question is not only how many complaints IPOA receives or investigations it completes. It is whether those investigations lead to charges, convictions and institutional reforms.

Dr Hesbon Owilla, a communications and governance expert, argues that IPOA has distinguished itself more than some other commissions but has not gone far enough.

“One would imagine that it would have distinguished itself judiciously, acting on so many issues that have touched on extrajudicial killing, abductions, killings,” Owilla said.

He acknowledged that some officers have been held culpable but argued that accountability has not reached senior levels.

“What we’ve not seen is the top ranking people who are responsible face the due process,” he said.

Owilla also questioned the transparency of action against lower-ranking officers and IPOA’s response to police excesses against citizens exercising their constitutional right to protest.

He argued that a presidential compensation task force should have drawn heavily from IPOA’s investigations.

“You would have expected that they ought to have drawn much of their data from IPOA,” he said.

For Owilla, the gap is therefore not simply the number of investigations but whether institutional responsibility reaches the police command.

The ODPP sits at the centre of that accountability chain. EACC can investigate corruption and IPOA can investigate police misconduct, but the ODPP determines whether many such cases proceed to criminal prosecution.

Its role makes prosecution outcomes e assential to assessing the performance of the wider system. A case may move from investigation to prosecution and then remain in court for years. When it fails, responsibility may be difficult to assign because investigations, prosecutorial decisions and judicial determinations belong to different institutions.

NCIC faces a different but equally serious challenge.

Created to promote national cohesion and address ethnic discrimination and hate speech, the commission has repeatedly been called upon during periods of political tension.

Yet recent events in Ol Kalou and Homa Bay show that ethnic profiling, inflammatory rhetoric and political violence remain concerns as Kenya approaches the 2027 election.

NCIC has claimed to be currently investigating complaints involving political figures, including former Deputy President Rigathi Gachagua and Cabinet Secretary Aden Duale. The commission has also been drawn into tensions surrounding political events in Homa Bay.

Owilla argues that NCIC has failed to establish itself as a people-centred institution. He said many Kenyans do not understand the commission or see its interventions as an exercise of their sovereign power.

He criticised its tendency to appear after inflammatory statements or incidents have already occurred.

“An old commission where we are pumping in billions cannot be reactionary,” Owilla said.

He argued that NCIC should invest more in public education so citizens understand the powers they have delegated to the institution.

Naituli pointed to Ol Kalou as evidence of institutional failure.His criticism extended to the wider appointment system.

Naituli argues that the President’s role in appointing panels involved in selecting commissioners creates a risk of political loyalty within institutions meant to scrutinise government.

“The only commissions that have lived to the expectations of Kenyans is only the office of the Controller and the Auditor-General,” he said.

He argued that the other commissions could be abolished.

Naituli proposed an independent recruitment body similar to the Judicial Service Commission, which would select candidates and submit a fixed list to the President without allowing the Executive to alter it.

“If the commission requires 70 people, that commission should send 70 people,” he said.

Owilla similarly blamed the quality and political connections of appointees, arguing that institutions have sometimes been populated by people who become accomplices of appointing authorities rather than guardians of the Constitution.

Both experts point to a problem deeper than funding: how leaders are selected.

For NCIC ahead of 2027, politicians facing only summonses or investigations without swift consequences may not be deterred.

The same principle applies to corruption and police accountability. A conviction after years is important, but deterrence depends on timely consequences.

Kenya’s watchdogs cannot therefore be judged simply by budgets, offices, staff numbers or cases opened.

Their scorecard must ask how much public money has been recovered, how many cases result in final convictions, how many police officers accused of serious abuses are held accountable, how quickly prosecutions are concluded and whether hate speech and ethnic mobilisation are declining.

A budget allocation is not itself a loss. The sharper question is whether spending produces the constitutional outcomes for which institutions were created.

Sixteen years on, Kenya does not lack watchdogs. It lacks sufficient evidence that the watchdogs have consistently changed behaviour.

EACC has demonstrated that major corruption cases can reach conviction. IPOA has shown that police misconduct can be independently investigated. The ODPP remains a critical bridge between investigations and prosecution. NCIC continues to intervene against hate speech.

But the persistent problems of corruption, police abuses, abductions, ethnic profiling and political incitement expose the limits of the current architecture.

As Kenya moves towards 2027, the test is becoming harder. The country must determine whether its independent institutions are genuinely independent, whether appointments produce competent leadership, whether investigations translate into consequences and whether citizens can see themselves in the institutions exercising power on their behalf.

Sixteen years after the Constitution promised stronger checks on power, the question is no longer whether Kenya has watchdogs. It is whether they can bite on behalf of Kenyan taxpayers.