Unchecked, DRC conflict could degenerate to Third Congo War

The Great Lakes region has been facing successive conflicts rooted in complex dynamics, plunging the region into an unprecedented political, security and humanitarian crisis and uncertainty.

The current March 23 Movement (M23) offensive in the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has placed several states in the Great Lakes Region on a trajectory of instability, war and potential destruction.

The M23, a primarily Congolese Tutsi rebel group, took up arms in 2012 after failed implementation of the March 23, 2009 Peace Agreement, thus driven by unfulfilled peace terms, ethnic tensions between Tutsi and Hutu groups, and regional dynamics. 

Evidently, an intense flare-up of tensions of this magnitude involving rebel groups in the Eastern DRC and neighbouring states has not been witnessed in the region for over two decades. According to the United Nations (UN), in the ongoing M23 conflict, more than 3,000 people have lost their lives, and nearly 2,880 were injured during the clashes in Goma.

The M23 offensive and the capture of of Goma on January 27, 2025 can be termed as the trigger for the current conflict and tensions in the region.

A brief engagement with the historical context demonstrates that the conflicts in DRC are protracted in nature and affect states, making the Great Lakes region volatile for close to a century.

First, are the deeply rooted effects of colonial legacy including arbitrary state boundaries and oppressive actions of Belgian authorities that saw the deliberate displacement of communities like Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge in the 1930s. This involved large-scale migration of Tutsis from both Rwanda and Burundi to eastern DRC.

Second, is the ‘Social Revolution’ (1959 – 1960) in the build-up to Rwanda’s independence where about 480,000 Tutsis fled from Rwanda with similar displacements taking place in the 1970s and 1990s.

Third, is the Rwanda genocide of 1994 where over 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed leading to further displacements and formation of ethnic-based militia groups such as the contentious FDLR.

Fourth, is the First Congo War (1996 – 1997) between Rwanda and Congo formerly Zaire with the help of other African states and the Second Congo War (1998 - 2002) which involved nine African countries from the region and approximately 25 armed groups, making it one of the largest wars in African history.

Cumulatively, the above resulted to the fragile nature of DRC since independence; a weak state, unstable political environment, large swathes of ungoverned spaces, myriads of external players with over 20 countries operating in DRC’s territory, European mercenaries and existence of other negative forces.

Additionally, the availability and increasing demand for precious minerals such as cobalt, lithium, gold and lead, which are considered as the driving force of the fourth industrial revolution, has led to a scramble for the mineral-rich regions in DRC, with private investors colluding with armed groups conduct illegal mining. The uncontrolled extraction of Congo's resources  by external powers using states as conduits in the extraction process has contributed to mistrust and inter-state tension in the Great Lakes region.

The capture of Goma by M23 rebels on January 27, 2025 and their subsequent advance towards South Kivu’s regional capital Bukavu, has led to uneasiness, particularly for Rwanda, which sees a stable eastern DRC as critical to its security.

The M23 have signaled their readiness to fight for ‘Congo’ thus ‘march to Kinshasa’ to oust Félix Tshisekedi's regime. Despite widespread international reports linking it to M23, Rwanda continues to deny direct involvement, citing concerns over the presence of the FDLR militia, composed of Hutu militants from the 1994 Rwandan genocide.

In their view, this is a valid national security concern emanating from the DRC, hence they are prepared to defend themselves. DRC has chosen a hard stance against Rwanda and is calling the M23 a terrorist group which needs to be destroyed.

According to Reuters, Uganda has deployed more than 1,000 extra soldiers into east Congo with their mission being uncertain. Burundi, which has demonstrated its intent of going to war with Rwanda, already has forces in eastern DRC.

The escalating tensions signifies serious security and humanitarian concerns but will also impact negatively on trade, movement of goods and services in the region.

Considering the above dynamics, there is an evident risk of a Third Congo War if concrete and non-coercive diplomatic steps which emphasise dialogue are not taken immediately.

To this end, the actions being robustly undertaken by East African Community (EAC) Heads of States championed by its Chairperson William Ruto and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) are pivotal in de-escalating the regional tension over the conflict in DRC.

The recent joint EAC – SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, clearly highlighted the causes of the conflict and tension over the eastern DRC and the attending inter-state tensions and called for the “cessation of hostilities and an immediate ceasefire…and peaceful resolution of the conflict through the Luanda and Nairobi process”.

 The summit decisions are important steps towards de-escalation of tensions. Emerging from the summit decision, cessation of hostilities and ceasefire will prevent further deaths and allow the flow of humanitarian services while peaceful resolution of the conflict using non-coercive means without pointing fingers or victimising key actors will help build trust and confidence between the conflicting parties for sustainable peace.